What also has to be understood here is the Pakistani army’s depraved and predatory attitude towards making money. Like armies in other Third World countries, the Pakistani army is first and foremost a business rather than a fighting machine. According to Ayesha Siddiqa, author of the book Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, “Pakistan’s army today runs a huge commercial empire,” whose estimated value “runs into the billions of dollars.”
The military’s true worth, Siddiqa maintains, cannot be exactly ascertained due to the lack of transparency. But two of the Pakistani military’s business groups are “the largest business conglomerates in the country.” They acquire “opportunities to monopolize national resources,” and the military’s “economic predatoriness increases in a totalitarian system” like Pakistan’s. The military economy’s “defining feature,” Siddiqa writes, is “concealment.”
In a nutshell, one of the main reasons for the existence of Pakistan’s security forces is the making of money, primarily for Pakistan’s officer corps. Fighting the War on Terror, let alone being a true or loyal friend to an “ally,” is not a top priority for Pakistani security forces — if it is any kind of “priority” at all. So when bin Laden dropped into the Pakistanis’ lap after 9/11, he represented a great opportunity, to many Pakistanis, to advance the agenda of worldwide jihad. To others, he was a tremendous business opportunity.
Thus, the Pakistani security forces, recognizing America’s burning desire to settle accounts with the al-Qaeda leader, took advantage of this situation for years to milk the infidel Americans for billions of dollars and the latest in American weaponry for possible later use against arch-enemy India. The Pakistanis pretended to be doing something for the money, while in reality, they did very little and, in the end, ended up being the hosts and protectors of bin Laden.
Former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, a former army officer, served as a good example of the Pakistani approach. He launched a couple of lackadaisical offensives into Waziristan that produced almost no casualties, hoping to justify, in American eyes, the largesse he was receiving. He also would allow only a very limited number of drone strikes against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Only when he was removed in 2008, seven years after 9/11, did the situation improve somewhat. The number of drone attacks increased dramatically and the Pakistani army launched a long-awaited offensive into the Taliban and al-Qaeda’s South Waziristan stronghold. However, the army is refusing to finish the job and attack North Waziristan.
The military’s true worth, Siddiqa maintains, cannot be exactly ascertained due to the lack of transparency. But two of the Pakistani military’s business groups are “the largest business conglomerates in the country.” They acquire “opportunities to monopolize national resources,” and the military’s “economic predatoriness increases in a totalitarian system” like Pakistan’s. The military economy’s “defining feature,” Siddiqa writes, is “concealment.”
In a nutshell, one of the main reasons for the existence of Pakistan’s security forces is the making of money, primarily for Pakistan’s officer corps. Fighting the War on Terror, let alone being a true or loyal friend to an “ally,” is not a top priority for Pakistani security forces — if it is any kind of “priority” at all. So when bin Laden dropped into the Pakistanis’ lap after 9/11, he represented a great opportunity, to many Pakistanis, to advance the agenda of worldwide jihad. To others, he was a tremendous business opportunity.
Thus, the Pakistani security forces, recognizing America’s burning desire to settle accounts with the al-Qaeda leader, took advantage of this situation for years to milk the infidel Americans for billions of dollars and the latest in American weaponry for possible later use against arch-enemy India. The Pakistanis pretended to be doing something for the money, while in reality, they did very little and, in the end, ended up being the hosts and protectors of bin Laden.
Former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, a former army officer, served as a good example of the Pakistani approach. He launched a couple of lackadaisical offensives into Waziristan that produced almost no casualties, hoping to justify, in American eyes, the largesse he was receiving. He also would allow only a very limited number of drone strikes against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Only when he was removed in 2008, seven years after 9/11, did the situation improve somewhat. The number of drone attacks increased dramatically and the Pakistani army launched a long-awaited offensive into the Taliban and al-Qaeda’s South Waziristan stronghold. However, the army is refusing to finish the job and attack North Waziristan.
-Continued in next blog post
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